

THE BRADFORD 'RIOT' OF 2001: A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS

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Introduction

In 2001 Britain saw another summer of rioting in its cities, in Oldham on May 26th, Leeds on June 5th, Burnley on June 23rd, and Bradford on July 7th. Although comparable to those of 1981 and 1985, in significant ways these 'riots' were quite different from earlier years, and mark a new departure in Britain's racial politics. In this paper we focus in particular on the Bradford riot of July 7th 2001 and specifically the views of the local South Asian community.

Britain has witnessed sequences of 'riots' involving racial factors since the late 1950s, when Whites and African Caribbeans fought in Nottingham and in Notting Hill, London (Fryer, 1984:376-81; Ramdin, 1987: 204-10). The 'riots' of 1981 and 1985 have been seen by subsequent commentators as community insurrections against the police. The antecedents on those occasions involved heavy policing of predominant African Caribbean communities. Furthermore, of particular relevance here was the 'riot', which took place in Manningham, Bradford on 10—12th June 1995, mainly involving South Asians. This was again popularly blamed on heavy policing, although the official reports simply blamed it on 'anti-social' individuals (The Bradford Commission Report, 1996: 11). The 'riots' of 2001 are more complex: whilst there are characteristics similar to those before where policing is involved, other factors have also emerged. There are both elements of 1950s-style race 'riots' with South Asians and Whites attacking each other's properties, and collaboration between Whites and South Asians confronting the police as a common adversary.

In addition these 'riots' cannot be divorced from a context in which minority ethnic communities were alarmed by the mobilization of neo-fascists such as the British National Party (BNP) and the National Front (NF). The 'riots' of 1958 were also related to neo-fascist mobilisations (Fryer, 1984:378; Ramdin, 1987: 206-8). Ethnic minority communities in all the areas where violence erupted have had their lives marked by ongoing, mundane and persistent racism. It is important to note that the signs in some places were clear beforehand. The spread of unrest was linked to an increase in racial violence, the long-standing mistrust and disillusionment with the police, the overt and taunting presence of the BNP and other far-right groups and the entrenched poverty and unemployment which existed within the cities (Ray and Smith, 2002).

There are real issues of economic and social deprivation for Pakistani and Bangladeshi communities. More than 80 per cent of the Pakistani and Bangladeshi community live in households whose income is below the national average; on average, households contain twice as many people as White households; more than half of Pakistan: and Bangladeshi households live in the most deprived 10% of wards in England, compared with only 14% of White households; Pakistani and Bangladeshi men are 2 ½ times more likely to be unemployed than White men and those in work receive only 2/3 of the average earnings of White men (Modood et. al. 1997; the Guardian 7 August 2001). However, the towns where the 'riots' occurred have variable proportions of people of South Asian origin among their populations, and variable proportions reporting themselves as Muslims (see Appendix tables 1 and 2).

The role of the NF in provoking the 'riots' was revealed in a Times report of the court appearance of ten of thirteen NF members arrested for provoking public disorder. They had marched through a multiethnic area of Oldham shouting racist abuse, chanting 'rights for Whites'

and bearing a Union Jack. All were from outside of Oldham. Addresses given in court were from Birmingham, Essex, London and South Wales. Oldham was clearly the target of a nationally coordinated NF campaign. (The Times, 19. 6. 01). On 23 April, St George's Day, BNP leader, Griffin announced that he would be standing in Oldham West in the forthcoming general election after national media reports that in Oldham there were more racially motivated attacks on Whites than Asians (The Times, 24. 4. 01). Apparently Oldham had been the focus of a struggle between Britain's two principal neo-fascist organisations – the BNP and the NF – with the BNP starting to recruit in the town some 18 months previously. Both use the language of 'racial justice' for Whites as illustrated in the slogan 'Rights for Whites' (The Times, 28. 5. 01). The BNP claims to have built its membership in Oldham from just two in 1999, to enough to have an organised presence in every local council ward in the town, and planned to stand candidates for every seat in the 2002 local elections in Oldham (The Times, 8.6.01.)

Although the BNP has publicly condemned violence, it is exploiting the 'riots' triggered by the NF and Combat 18 to cultivate support. The BNP (as its website makes clear) has singled out Muslims as its chosen enemies. It claims to offer a radical alternative to the mainstream parties who have abandoned White working class areas. Therefore, instead of any progressive alternative it has presented 'racial' solutions to real problems. The BNP saw the violence that summer as its best opportunity in years to put its anti-immigration views onto the political agenda, asking for Belfast-style peace walls to divide Asian and White communities in Oldham and a boycott of South Asian businesses. Its agenda remains 'repatriation' for Asians and the black communities.

As the Labour Party has neglected its core White working class social base, the BNP has seen the opportunity to mobilise this group under the theme of 'rights for Whites'. Its deputy leader has recent convictions (in 1986 and 1991) for violence against ethnic minorities, and the leader Nick Griffin has a recent conviction (1998) for inciting racial hatred (Observer 1.7.01). 'Rights for Whites', has become a powerful frame for working class grievances in northern towns, and BNP voters are quick to use this language to legitimise their political allegiances:

'I voted BNP and I don't worry who knows it. Everyone in the street voted for them. This morning I feel like someone is actually fighting for the White people of Oldham, for their rights.' (Quote from Rhona Norton BNP voter in The Times, 9.6.01.)

In this paper we have two principal aims firstly to outline some of the principal feature of the 'riot' on 7th July 2001, why it happened and its political significance for the Pakistani community in particular. This immediately raises issues of how different sections of the community evaluated the 'riot', and in particular the differing perspectives of the first generation migrants compared to the younger second and third generations born in Britain. However, central to understanding these 'riots' are the neo-fascist mobilisations that have occurred around them. The most serious of the 'riots' – in Bradford, Burnley and Oldham – were in part motivated by resistance to racist mobilisations by neo-fascist groups and parties.

Theorising the 'riots' of the 1980s.

Views of the 1980s wave of 'riots' as 'irrational' are not unknown (see for example Jahoda, 1982: 96-7), and claims about the effects of unemployment and urban deprivation were also made (Benyon, 1984). However, sociological discussions were more circumspect, stressing that unemployment often leads to a retreat from political action (Roberts, 1984), or that it generated a predisposition towards 'violent protest' without clear political goals (Benyon and Solomos, 1987). When the evidence is inspected more closely, only about half of those arrested in July 1981 for instance were unemployed, very much what one would expect among inner city young people at the time (Beynon, 1984: 41-2).

In contrast there were also those who saw 'race' as central to understanding the 1980s 'riots', where unemployment and other deprivations are simply expressions of the wider structural subordination of 'Blacks' in Britain. In particular these approaches emphasised the 'militarisation' of policing methods with respect to 'Black' neighbourhoods (Gilroy, 1987: 236-45; Lea and Young, 1982; Reicher, 1984). These accounts see the immediate causes of the 'riots' as the activities of the

police. The response was not one of 'irrationality', despite the obvious emotion expressed during the events. Some of rioters exercised considerable control and selectivity in their actions when defending their 'territory' against the 'incursions' of the police. These include rioters directing traffic in the 1980 Bristol riot (Reicher, 1984: 6-10) to defending shops where children were sleeping (Gilroy, 1987: 238-41). The human targets of the rioters were, with a few notable exceptions, the police and media workers, and the property destroyed either that of the police or unpopular local business people.

These analyses in our view are now seriously dated. In certain respects they represent analytically flawed accounts. Reicher (1984) and Gilroy (1987) (who bases much of his argument on Reicher's article) in particular have what we would call a 'romantic' view of the 1980s 'riots'. Their discussions have the effect of erasing certain aspects. In particular they tend to ignore the role of South Asians in the 'riots' of the 1980s. People of African-Caribbean origin were a minority of those arrested for offences during the 1981 'riots', however, this is not to say that they were 'multi-racial insurrections' (Keith, 1993).

The most systematic attempt to generalise about and theorise the 1980s 'riots' is found in Waddington (1992). Presenting a rather formal model reminiscent of Smelser (1962) he argues that the rioters were economically deprived and saw mainstream politics and illegitimate as they could not influence decision-making, suggesting that they had norms and behaviours seen as either illegitimate or criminal. Routinely these groups are seen as hostile by the police and negatively stereotyped by the media. During the 1980s he argued that the moral panic around 'Black crime' and subsequent police responses were critical here. These group regarded their urban spaces as 'their territory' to be defended against the police, and there are often rumours and expectation of conflict with the police. In these situations 'riots' arise in response to particular events such as an arrest, and the conflict escalates into violence on both sides.

We are inclined to be critical of Waddington's approach, as his model is very generalised and he argues that it can apply to urban 'riots', violence in industrial disputes and football hooliganism. Consequently, important factors tend to be introduced descriptively, rather than analytically. As 'riots', picket line violence and football hooliganism all take a similar form - they are all 'public disorders', the model assumes that there is some essentially similar underlying sets of factors or succession of events. However, we feel that this confuses the form of the action - it is violent; with its substantive content - the reasons why its happens. Waddington presents his account as a series of discrete levels of analysis, but on closer inspection some factors appear at several levels. For instance policing appears throughout, but it is not an analytical focus in its own right. Finally, using Waddington's model it is difficult to explain why 'riots' come in waves.

Looking back on this literature with the benefit of hindsight there are obvious continuities and discontinuities, but there are also some important aspects of the 1980s 'riots' that seem to have been 'lost' from the literature. Firstly, the 'riots' of 1981 and 1985 should be seen as part of the same 'wave' of action starting in the late 1970s, and that they were often in response to neo-fascist mobilisations. The parallels with 2001 are striking in this respect. In 1981 a new anti-immigrant 'Nationality Act' was being debated in parliament (compare to Asylum Seekers), and (usually NF) marches were banned for periods of up to a month in Leicester, Wolverhampton, Leeds, Barnsley, Doncaster, Rotherham, London, Sheffield and Oxford. On 23rd May 1981 in Coventry 10,000 White and South Asian people marching for protection against racist attacks were met by a counter-demonstration of neo-fascists from the NF and the British Movement, and on 1st July 1981 disturbances around a neo-fascist skinheads' concert in Southall led to disturbances between the local South Asian community and the police (Cowell et. al., 1981). Secondly, there is a tendency to focus on the social base of the 'rioters' as being 'African-Caribbean' young men. This ignores the role of South Asians and Whites in some 'riots', as well as the involvement of women, children and older people in some instances. In this respect there is a sharp contrast with 2001.

The 'riots' of 1991-95 have received less attention from sociologists. With one exception they were in largely 'White' areas, and thus lacked the social drama of ethnic conflict. Studies have focused on the disorganising effects of economic marginalisation and unemployment, as mediated through criminally violent masculinity (Powers and Tunstall, 1997: 43-9). Interpretations of these 'riots' have been decidedly 'de-politicised'. Campbell (1993) saw them as a masculine response to the crisis of unemployment. It is not a crisis of masculinity, but crime, violence and rioting were

distinctly white, male working class responses to economic marginalisation shaped by the 'negative' models of masculinity presented in the media. More pertinent to our discussion here is Burlet and Reid's (1998) analysis of the Bradford 'riot' of 1995, that was a response to police action. Although the events share many characteristics with the 'urban riots' of the 1970s and 1980s, they emphasise the 'gendered' character of the events and the role of unemployed young Pakistani men. The Bradford Commission Report was more blunt. The 'riots' were caused by the 'anti-social' behaviour of those who took part (The Bradford Commission Report, 1996: 11).

Finally, there are attempts to see the 'riots' of the 1970s through to the 1990s as forms of working class protest (Hasan, 2000). This is based largely on an overview of riots of the 1980s and 1990s and tends to reduce the meaning of the riots to the facts that overall a wide range of people of diverse ethnic origin were involved. It is not only a questionable generalisation about what that ethnic diversity means in the context of those riots (Keith, 1993: 116), but also if applied to 2001, where South Asian and White with more often in conflict, it fatally overlooks the role of popular racism, neo-fascist mobilisation and 'New Labour' racism.

Methodology

Fieldwork was conducted in Bradford where existing community and professional networks facilitated sample recruitment. Organisations included community groups and community centres, religious institutions, council organisations disability groups and the Fair Justice For All Campaign. In addition informal meetings were held with some Police officers including the senior officer in command on 7th July 2001. Further contacts were also made informally by the use of snowballing techniques.

The semi-structured interviews were framed around the following headings: reasons for 'riots', generation & gender, integration, media, authorities, knowledge of rioters, differences between 'riots', race & community, far right and future expectations. All the interviews were tape recorded and transcribed later. Informants were offered a choice of languages; all the young and middle-aged interviewees chose to be interviewed in English. The older participants spoke either Urdu or Punjabi. Interviews conducted in languages other than English were translated and transcribed simultaneously. In total 34 interviews and one focus group were conducted with 19 male and 21 female participants. Informant's ages ranged from 16 to over 60, with slightly more younger women and more older men.

It is important to stress that the data presented here is from half of the individuals interviewed, as the remainder are still being transcribed, the findings should be regarded as provisional and preliminary. In addition we have drawn extensively upon the media reports of the 'riots' and their aftermath. In particular we have presented statistical summaries of certain key data from the court cases arising from the 'riots' involving 99 individuals reported upon in the Bradford Telegraph and Argus.

'It was all rumours': views of why the 'riots' happened.

The Bradford 'riot' over the weekend of 7th-8th July was reputedly the worst on mainland Britain for twenty years. On the night of 9th July, there was a riot involving 200 Whites in Bradford. An Indian takeaway, and a Pizza takeaway also owned by a South Asian family were attacked. These were widely seen as 'reprisals' for the weekend's 'riot' (YEP 10.7.01.)

The original disturbances in Bradford started in the city centre in mid-afternoon after an anti-racist demonstration against a proposed NF rally, which the Home secretary had already banned. Police cornered a group of anti-racist demonstrators at Centenary Square. Some recognised NF members appeared but did not attempt to march. Violence started after a group of White youths, suspected NF members, made racially abusive comments, and attacked a 21-year-old Asian man (this was only reported in some newspapers) (DE 9.7.01, YP. 9.7.01).

There were other relevant background factors in the Bradford outbreak. The city's annual multi-cultural festival was due to reach its culmination that Saturday, but the mere threat or suspicion that the NF might turn up despite the ban prompted festival organisers to cancel the closing days festivities. In response anti-fascist groups including Bradford trades union council and the anti-nazi league leafleted Friday nights centenary square concert inviting the multiracial crowd to a peaceful gathering in the same place next day. To underline the peaceful intent,

participants were even encouraged to turn up in fancy dress or carnival costumes (and some did). The Saturday crowd in the square about 40 to 50 per cent White included a small proportion of African-Caribbean's, but mainly South Asians. The latter group included Sikhs and Hindus, community elders and young women, but most were men. This is important, as when the 'riot' developed and the crowd was moved on it changed composition into being almost entirely South Asian men.

Police, including dog handlers and mounted officers, effectively sealed off one side of the square and began forcing the crowd out of the city centre uphill in the general direction of Manningham. The stone throwing towards the police broke out in the Sunbridge road area and from late afternoon 'rioting' was well under way. Press photographs and TV footage showed that White as well as Asian men were actively involved in the outbreak at least in the early stages (T&A, YP, YEP). One of our interviewees, as a magistrate, provides an 'official' view of why the 'riots' happened:

It was all rumours. Also you see I don't think BNP were genuinely planning to come to Bradford and march here they knew they had no chance, it was all rumours and unfortunately the Anti Nazi League and all those youngsters went to the City Centre and they played into the hands of the BNP. The only members of the BNP that arrived into Bradford were only four of them who came by train and they were sent back straight from the interchange platform, straight back. They were not even allowed to leave the platform. (Javed Seth, 47, magistrate and member of police liaison committee)

However, most people we have interviewed, including eye-witnesses felt there was more substance to the rumours, and they located the immediate cause of the riot around certain events in the city centre. In particular some pointed out the need for the community to defend itself in the light of the recent events in Oldham:

... it was to do with the National Front march and I think they were allowed permission to march through Bradford and I think the Anti-Nazi Group, they objected to it and held a demonstration down in Centenary Square and I think it was both sided really. There was word that there was some National Front members, because the march was cancelled or shouldn't have been allowed or wouldn't have been allowed, some of them were already in Bradford in pubs etc. (Zahida Ali, 31)

Right, well it was all to do with the march that err, the Nazi movement wanted to do and I think was most people they were scared of what happened in Oldham because they were all in suburban areas and they attacked people in their homes and so I think everyone was scared and they wanted to defend themselves. But what they did they didn't go the right way about it but I think the intentions at the beginning weren't bad.

They were just trying to defend themselves of what happened in Oldham so it shouldn't have really happened, but I think that is why it happened. [...] The march of the NF group. (Kamran Ahmad (age 19) and Omar Akhbar (age 20))

I think that week there were rumours that the National Front were coming to Bradford and I think all that week youth workers were talking of holding this kind of meeting, in the centre of town in Centenary Square. (Alisah Khaleeq, 38)

Well there talk of the National Front coming down and so all the Asians got to together to fight them off basically and not let them take over. (Ibrar Khan, 18)

In addition the police responses to minor disturbances in the city centres were criticised, as well as the tactics of moving the crowd in one direction up through Westgate towards the Girlington/Manningham area:

Whilst we were in town, we were in town during the day in the morning and they were a few NF's that were in Centenary Square and we were walking through and there was a couple of Asian women which were walking through the town and two NF's went and spat at them and threw a drink over them. Right, the Police weren't far off, the Police were watching but they didn't do nothing. Nothing at all. And later on there was an Asian guy and he started swearing and sticking fingers up and the Policeman came up to him and gave him a warning, listen don't do that, that is abusive and this that and the other. And I don't see that as being fair. A woman has just been spat on and has drink thrown all over her right and one lad just swears at the other man and the Police come and give the Asian guy a warning and the two white men didn't get nothing, nothing at all. (Kamran Ahmad (age 19) and Omar Akhbar (age 20))

I heard a lad was walking past a pub or something and got some sort of abuse or attacked and somebody actually ran down where the demo was being planned at Centenary Square and he started shouting and I think everybody from there started like. [...] An Asian lad, yeah. But then I also heard that a few Asians lads had started with some white lads as well so I mean that was just the word around. To my knowledge that is how it started that there were a few National Front members already in Bradford and they'd abused or attacked some Asian lad and there was a big group of them gathered and that is where it started. (Zahida Ali, 31)

Yeah initially it started off as a group of say fifteen to twenty youths in the town centre none of them from Bradford. And instead of closing them off in the town centre, they [the police] pushed them towards White Abbey. Now personally I can not see the sense in that, moving them away from the town centre into a residential area. I don't see the tactics there, what were they trying to achieve? You know it was like town centre everyone uses lets push them back into the Paki area basically, let them deal with their own. I was in the town centre and there was a handful of people that were throwing stones and stuff but when they pushed them up into Girdlington they came across a couple of hundred at least and it grew steadily from there. (Imran Ismail, 28)

Younger men in particular interpreted the events not only in terms of 'defending' Bradford, or they would say 'Bradistan' against organised racist attack, they also saw the riots as intimately connected to the immediately prior events in Burnley and Oldham. Bradford in this sense is a symbolic location for British Pakistanis, to be defended because it is the 'heart' of the people:

I think the people of Bradford stuck up for themselves, stood up and you know went for it really. Coz people in Oldham right, I don't know the facts but I am just telling you what I think and what I know. You know maybe they are just rumours on the street I don't know but what we heard was people in Oldham and where else was it? Burnley or something.

Burnley, yeah.

Yeah places like that people, the Asian people were beaten up. They lost the battle. But like people in Bradford won the war.

YH: What did you win?

No one really, we didn't win nothing really but you proved that we can stand up for ourselves. You know we are not going to be pushed around by. We don't care if there is two or three hundred of you who is going to walk into our town and say "oh we have come to batter you" we are not going to run home and hide underneath the beds.

YH: So you won the war against the BNP?

Yeah that is the way people see it. That is the way I see it as well, yeah more or less.

YH: And Oldham lost the battle?

Yeah because, Oldham, Burnley or wherever. Wherever the NF went, they went and did the damage and came back and you know the NF were let's say victorious. But when they come in Bradford they couldn't get nowhere. They did try and basically they went, so they lost.

[...] Yeah they came to cause trouble. Maybe in one sense they have won because of the Police they you know, sending all the people in Bradford down you know, all the Asian people who were in the riots. Maybe in that sense they won, but I don't think they are really going to come back. They have been put in their place. Maybe this time if they come they will think twice.

YH: But why Bradford? Why not other areas?

Because Bradford is like. As you know that Bradford has got the name of Bradistan. You have probably heard that right?

YH: No what is that?

Bradistan like in Pakistan. Like heart of all Pakistani people. (Kamran Ahmad, 19 and Omar Akhbar, 20)

Targets and actions during the 'riot'

The 'targets' of the rioters were overwhelmingly the police and white-owned property and businesses. Damage estimated at £25 million was caused, with a single BMW dealership accounting for more than £20 million. Police claimed 300 crimes were committed ranging from robbery and looting to arson and assault. There were fire attacks on six pubs, a Labour club and a Conservative club. Over 200 police officers were reported as injured, out of almost 1,000 deployed from the West Yorkshire and other forces. Some of our informants felt that some properties were targeted because of their White ownership:

Yeah the butchers shop on the corner which is probably the only White meat shop in the area, but none of the Asian shops on Oak Lane were touched. Even down by the garage on Abbey Road where the 'riots' were happening none of those cars were touched. You know Whetley Motors? That belongs to an Asian chap. None of the Asians shops, all the shops along there are Asian and none of those were touched. But the pubs on there were damaged and burnt down. Which you know it just makes you think OK you might not approve what of what is going on in the pubs and I think the reason why they went for the pubs because they are places for right wing extremist to gather, the NF or whatever. (Alisah Khaleeq)

... most Asian peoples don't drink or are not supposed to drink. They think that a pub is going to be owned by a white person. Now these white people have come and attacked up so if they've gone, if they have attacked us and run off all we can do is get back at them by getting the other white people that are living here. So I reckon that is why they did it. (Kamran Ahmad, 19 and Omar Akhbar, 20)

I actually went over to the BMW garage. I lived in that area you see so I knew everyone and all the people that started off by bricking the BMW garage and setting the cars on fire were not from that area. They were thieves that had come there to specifically to steal the cars. And the people who are supposedly the criminals and the rioters were stood back saying "Oi, don't come round here, I know these people that live here. You want to do that, do it some where else". And they are the ones that are getting blamed for the riot. (Imran Ismail, aged 28)

This last quote about events around the BMW garage raises three important issues: the role of 'rioters' from outside of Manningham, the role of purely criminal activity and the role of 'rioters'

controlling public space. Other analysts of 'riots', such as Reicher (1984: 12) have discussed this latter point. Imran Ismail's account of what was happening at the BMW garage suggests the rioter's were controlling their local neighbourhood against outside criminals. The same interviewee gave a parallel account of how a women news photographer was 'escorted' out of the crowd and handed over to the police lines:

They [the 'rioters'] were thinking you are taking our photos what do you think you are doing. So they didn't actually take the camera but they took the film out of it and they returned the camera and says "Get out of it before we jump you". [...] they had the sense to take the film out of the camera, return the camera to her, take her back to the Police line, it was like an escort before she got jumped by all the others. About seven guys around her, escorting her to the Police line. They didn't go up to the Police line but go so far up and said "Walk". (Imran Ismail, aged 28)

There was also evidence of protection being offered to local White people, some businesses and even offering the police tea and biscuits:

You know there was one lad with an old lady she just lives off White Abbey Road and she lives in some flats and she was scared and because he knew her, he went in there and sat with her and got a group of them. He knew that nothing was going to happen to her and that no one was going to attack them but obviously she is White, she is old, she was thinking oh are a load of them going to come in here and attack me. He actually went there and sat there all night, he took his wife over and they sat there reassuring her that everything was going to be fine. (Zahida Ali, 31)

A student who protected a pet shop owner and a pregnant woman from the baying mob during the heat of the Bradford 'riots' has been given a reduced prison sentence. Mudasar Khan was told that he deserved two years in jail for hurling a piece of rubble towards police lines during the troubles, but a judge yesterday decided to reduce that by half after hearing how the 21-year-old intervened to stop pet shop owner Pete Booth being attacked. Mr Booth told the city's crown court how he feared for his premises in Sunbridge Road, his teenage daughter and a work colleague when the violence erupted last July. And he told how Khan and other Asian youths had stood guard in the doorway of his business. Mr Booth, who has run the pet shop for 32 years, said it was a scene of "pandemonium" as he and his colleague tried to drag bird stands and other equipment back into the shop. But he said Khan and the other youths ran over to help. "As we were getting the last things in the shop it was absolutely chaotic," he said. "This gentleman and about four other youths stood across the front of my door. They were protecting myself, the man who works for me and my shop. They were stopping them coming through...they (the rioters) could have destroyed the shop. "They were all putting their arms up and saying: 'Stop, this is stupid.'" Mr Booth estimated that Khan and others were outside his shop for about ten or 15 minutes and he described how Khan and another youth then went to the aid of a pregnant woman and a female shopper who were caught up in the violence. (Bradford Telegraph and Argus, 23.1.02)

I saw, you know when a couple of the pubs got attacked you know, there was a small group of them that were going in and attacking the pub but then you had a lot of Asians that went in to get them out. You know and make sure they were safe. I mean I saw a lot of, when the Police were actually lined up on a certain road which is Heaton Road, I saw Asian families coming out and giving them tea and biscuits. You know and my opinion was "I hope they choke on that". Yeah there were people talking to the Police or offering them Rich Tea biscuits or a cup tea, I saw some of that going on yeah. (Zahida Ali, 31, support worker)

Crowd composition

The question of who was in the crowd during 'riots' has been relatively neglected in some studies, or at the very least accounts have been rather problematic in assuming certain characteristics. The popular image of the 2001 Bradford 'rioters' is one of 'delinquent Pakistani youths', as in the 1995 Bradford disturbances. This is also an image that has leaked into the academic literature (see for example Burlet and Reid, 1998). Indeed aside from Keith (1993: 96-119) many academic accounts of the 1980s 'riots' constructed a similar stereotype of the 1980s 'rioters' as young African Caribbean men. Keith demonstrated that the majority of those arrested during the Brixton riot of 1981 were over 21 and a third were White. In all of the 'riots' in London in 1981 of those arrested, the largest single ethnic group was White. As Keith argues these apparently 'empiricist' matters are significant, because they serve to debunk not only media myths, but also 'official' accounts of the 'riots', and many intellectual analyses. Where, for instance, does it leave Waddington's and Gilroy's influential accounts that stress the collective identity of African Caribbean youth?

Our data is admittedly more limited than that of Keith. It has been generated from an analysis of the reports of the sentencing in the local newspaper the Bradford Telegraph and Argus. We do not want to argue that it provides us with an entirely accurate account of who the rioters were, but together with eyewitness accounts it can at least challenge some myths. It is the outcome of a long and complex process of social construction. Starting from the actions of the police on the day in terms of arrests and videoing the events, there is clearly some selectivity at this stage. Those who were identifiable and then handed themselves over to the police, often at the instigation of relatives, followed by the processing through the criminal justice system. Furthermore, there are the vagaries of the reporting process itself. Although around 200 were arrested subsequently, we have records on 99 individual cases (86 from the Manningham 'riot' of 7th July and 13 from the Ravenscliffe 'riot' of 9th July) from the newspaper reports. Subsequently these have undergone our own quantitative analysis. Given that many were convicted on the basis of video evidence and admitted their offences, we do feel that the following data can tell us something useful descriptively about the crowd.

Table 3 reveals the relative ethnic homogeneity of the 7th July crowd, with just 5 per cent being White. More striking perhaps is the age of the crowd with the majority aged 21 or over. A more detailed breakdown showed that 45 per cent were aged 21 to 29, with the youngest being 13 and the eldest 47 and the average age being 22. In his analysis of the 1981 'riots' Keith found that 54.6 per cent of Asians arrested were aged 21 or over (1993: 107), and our figure is a remarkably close 53.7 per cent! These data both confirm and challenge our eyewitnesses' accounts.

YH

Who do you think took part in the riots, what type of people?

ZA

A lot of teenagers, youngsters. I mean you can't really say they were youngsters, I mean some kids look older than what they are. There was various people there. A lot of young lads. I saw some Black lads in there, and some White lads mixed in the crowds you know I did see a mixture of people. (Zahida Ali, age 31)

However, the following shows how the crowd became homogenised through police action on the day. As the city centre was cleared, and the crowd pushed up towards Manningham its ethnic composition changed. This also fits with the newspaper reports of the location of the offences, for which people had been arrested, which mostly occurred on Whetley Hill and White Abbey Road:

There were Black people present, there were Sikh's present, Indians present and there were White people present. Now that was not mentioned at all. It suddenly turned into a Pakistani riot and it got coverage from the bottom of Whetley Hill. (Imran Ismail, age 28)

A further theme has been claims about where the rioters came from, with suggestions that many were from outside the immediate area, and that rioters were using their mobile phones to call in friends from outside Bradford. This is another issue that has a long history. It was a popular myth during the 1980s that riots were caused by 'outside agitators', despite a lack of evidence to support this claim. In contrast, accounts more sympathetic to the rioters (Reicher, 1984; Gilroy, 1987; Waddington, 1992) stressed the local residence of the participants. The riot principally took place on Whetley Hill and White Abbey Road in Manningham, Bradford 8, known as the area of densest South Asian residence. Addresses are only reported for those aged 17 or over. Of those individuals whose addresses were reported, however, 28 per cent of the rioters came from BD8 'Manningham', with a further 21 per cent from BD9 'Heaton' immediately to the north (appendix, table 4).

One feature of eyewitness accounts of the riot was the role purported to be played by 'gangs'. In the context of a discussion about the different areas of Bradford that have 'gangs' it was emphasised that on the day of the riot, the traditional enmity between young Pakistani men from different areas of the city was temporarily suspended:

YH

And what happened on the days of the riots then?

They all come together. Say the Girdlington Boys standing next to the Manningham Boys saying listen bro. pass us a brick.

Yeah and there you go (laughing).

And on a normal day "Oi where you from?" "I'm from Manningham" And they would brick him instead. You know what I mean instead of saying oh listen bro. pass us a brick. Like I was saying on occasions like that they are come together. But on a normal day like today, if you can call it a normal day it is divided... (Kamran Ahmad, 19 and Omar Akhbar, 20)

The question of the South Asian gang is one fraught with risks of pathologisation (Alexander, 2000). If gang membership can be linked to criminal activity, then those arrested for their role in the 'riots' show little hard evidence of having been convicted for earlier crimes, as 90 per cent had no previous convictions reported by the newspaper at the time of their sentencing. Indeed their previous good character was often commented upon. Furthermore, the age of the majority of those appearing in the newspaper reports suggests that only a minority were associated with 'gangs'. Nevertheless, the newspaper report data and the eye-witness accounts do support each other in that the rioters were largely from outside Manningham (BD8) the immediate location of the riot. However, the outside agitator and rioter brought in from outside of Bradford by mobile phone appear to be largely mythical creations. It seems they were just as likely to be explaining their whereabouts to relatives:

Zamir Hussain was caught on police video footage answering a call from his wife on his mobile phone after he failed to return from work as expected. (Bradford Telegraph and Argus, 9.3.02)

Zamir Hussain was sentenced to four and a half years for riot, being accused of rolling burning cars and hitting golf balls towards towards police lines.

Generational Differences in Views About the 'Riots'

Socialisation into cultural and religious values, against the backdrop of a potentially hostile majority culture, is a major concern of minority ethnic groups (Rex 1991). Young people may be introduced to influences many parents would wish to guard them against (Anwar, 1998). The younger generation usually respect this, although they are beginning to question some of their parents' values and assumptions, as they adopt more Western values. This rarely leads to direct conflict since these Western values are considered alongside - and not instead of - ethnic, religious

and cultural identification. Nonetheless, what is of particular interest is that the younger generation have to negotiate with their parents.

This is usually done through using particular and flexible interpretations of cultural rules and avoiding open displays of behaviours, which would cause offence. For young South Asian people in the UK, identity is informed by how they identify with their parents' ethnic, cultural and religious values within the broader British culture (Modood et al.,1994). This is why establishing autonomy and independence, although as important to Asian young people living in the UK as their 'white' counterparts can assume different connotations. In the diaspora, the second and subsequent generation finds itself navigating within a social context which differs entirely from that which they share with their own parents. For the first generation, the traumas of migration, dispersal and exile from their native country as well as the discrimination they experienced have become potent forces in the formation of their political and social relations; this differs from their children (Gilroy, 1993). Their children born or brought up in Britain eat South Asian food at home, speak their parents' first language, wear 'traditional' clothes and watch South Asian films. Outside the home, they are competent in English ways, speak English and increasingly successful academically. A cultural synthesis has been created of two very different cultures, not out of compromise but by being critical and affirmative of both cultures (Anwar, 1998).

Academic, policy and lay discussion tend to over-emphasise 'cultural conflict' between young people and their parents (Brah 1992). Literature on inter-generational relations, although describing social change, presents a picture of cultural retention and successful negotiation of identities (Anwar, 1998). The notion of unchanging South Asian communities whose social ideas as well as political and economic interests were readily knowable and transferred into their cultures no longer exists. The increasingly desperate assertions of homogeneity, which flow out of South Asian vernacular culture, attempt to conceal the transformation. Homogeneity signifies unity, but unity is not homogeneity. This homogeneity is riven by generation, gender and class. Consequently, authoritarian South Asian culture is in decline. These dynamics are expressed among those we have interviewed.

There was a clear division between the older and younger generation in particular the men. Older men and younger men displayed sharply contrasting views of the 'riots'. The older men were strongly critical of the actions of the younger men, and for the younger men they were protecting their own community and couldn't understand why there was such hostility from the older generation according to Imran Ismail (age 28), "The Pakistani youth of Bradford are perceived to be criminals by the media and by other citizens, including their own elders".

For the older generation they had a common perspective, conflict is wrong. The interviews with them revealed their outrage and disgust at what took place and in particular towards the younger generations. This generation talked about how they educated their children to live in peace, to them the 'riots' showed a rejection of those values in favour of delinquency. According to 60 year old Anwar Baig., "We live in this country and we love this country because we have a much easier life here. We should not destroy it in this way".

The older generation fail to acknowledge the reasons for the younger generation's actions. The younger generation felt their community was being threatened. For the older generation, they cannot understand the reasons for their children rioting, according to Naveed Jamil (age 51) and Asgar Anwar (age 78) "I think that just show how stupid the youths are. When a gang of youths get together, it's impossible to try and control them. I don't think they stopped to think what they were doing was wrong, they just enjoyed the thrill of doing it."

The older generation of South Asians were keen to engage in discussions about the attacks but as parallel to their own experiences. These men talked about how they were attacked by White people in the 1960s and 1970s, but refused to engage in any form of conflict or 'riots'. For this generation, discrimination was experienced in all spheres of social life, including employment and housing in which their physical and cultural traits were held in low esteem by the dominant segments of society. Although victims of racial violence they offered little resistance. They defined their relationship with England as positive and were worried about the impression others had. The older generation created a perspective of a quiet community who were only contributing positively to society, according to Anwar Baig, "We have lived in this country for years and we had built up respect for ourselves but now there is nothing but humiliation. Everybody thinks the

Asians are troublemakers now". It is this image which the parental generation finds difficult to accept and now feel threatened, according to Naveed Jamil and Asgar Anwar, "I have lived in the UK since 1944 and I have lived peacefully, but now I fear for my life. I don't go out in the evenings because I am scared that some hoodlum is going to rob and kill me". They feel vulnerable to the racism which they experienced, and women also expressed this in terms of being in a foreign country:

It was wrong for them to act in this way. We are in a foreign country and we should act appropriately. (Rashida Shah, aged 54)

I thought that if the youths started to get into trouble like this, then it would not bode well for us. It will damage our reputation. We are living in a foreign country but that doesn't mean that you go out and destroy that country. (Zafeera Javed, aged 55)

These feelings of insecurity have also been expressed as anger towards the younger generation. Although mostly aimed towards those implicated, they questioned the role of the parents. Elderly respondents blamed the parents for lacking control over their children, according to Naveed Jamil and Asgar Anwar, "The men should have control of the boys and their wives should have control over their daughters" they go on to say, "the parents should know where their children are at all times. Its no point them being asleep if the child is coming in at 1 or 2 o'clock in the morning. They have no idea where their child has been and that is no good. If the parents had a sense of responsibility they would stay awake and ask their child where he got to and what has he been doing". Parents' irresponsibility were thought to lie in their inability to look after their children.

Elderly respondents also blamed for the authority for the lack of control they have over their children according to Naveed Jamil and Asgar Anwar, "Nowadays you can't ask your children where they have been because they can call the police and say that we have been hassling them. I think the parent's rights have been restricted as how to control their children. No parent is going to discipline their child with the threat of child abuse hanging over them". He related the control they had over their children when in Pakistan, "in Pakistan we are allowed to hit children in order to keep them in control and that is why the children there grow up to be responsible adults. If we touch a child here, we end up going to prison. So what is the point of trying to discipline them? The police and social workers have ruined our lives in this country".

Even the younger generation talked about the changes already occurring with the parental generation where now an attempt is made to control their children. Many of the parents remarked having no knowledge what their children were up to, according to 21 year old Shabnam Ishaq, (talking about the older generation) "After this has happened they have probably come more aware of what their kids are doing. I think it has probably made them realise that letting them out can cause more trouble but saying that you can't lock them up. So I probably think they are keeping an eye out for their kids but obviously you can't follow them everywhere and are just hoping and praying that they are not doing anything wrong".

Such was the disgust of the elders that when the 'wanted list' of rioters were printed in the local newspapers, it was the parents who took their children to the police stations. According to 28 year old Imran Ismail, "most of the perpetrators of the 'riots' were brought to the Police Station by their parents and they were under the misguided concept that there was justice in the society of Bradford but there is no such thing."

"We're not here to go, we're here to stay": the Second and Subsequent Generations

The second generation has political values of equality, higher expectations of education and the labour market, but is disillusioned in the face of continuing racism and the first generation's compromises with the White power structure. Younger South Asian people are critical of the police, fearful of the far right, and resentful of the media, which they say stirred up trouble with one-sided reporting of racial attacks, only paying attention when it was suggested that most racially motivated attacks were by South Asians on Whites. The rioting shows that the new generation of young men in particular are shunning the acquiescent attitude of their parents and elders and

demanding radical change. The second generation are aware of their own position and their own rights in Britain. Education has heightened their awareness of these rights and their assertion of them:

... they [the elders] always saw themselves as outsiders whereas the youth of today believe that they have a right to stay here, we were born here. We contribute to society, to the communities, this is our home. We might be a Pakistani minority but we are British citizens and we are British so we deserve equality and everything. We get taxed the same as everyone, we have to follow the same laws so we can't we share the same privileges as everyone else? (Imran Ismail, 28)

Because I think with the older generation being here a long time they are used to racist remarks and they have always kept quite from they day they have been here. I think with the younger population they tend to stick up for themselves. They will not take shit from people for no reason. Today's generation, if they tend to get a racist remark they will answer them back. They would not just sit there and listen to it and that is probably why it was mostly that age range of men involved in the riot. (Shabnam Ishaq)

As well as negotiating with the parental generation, the younger generation wish to celebrate their ethnic, cultural and religious difference. This becomes important as an important marker of social identity. Further, such identifications become especially salient in terms of the 'second generation'. Defining ethnicity is far from straightforward and the term embodies notions of language, culture, religion, nationality, and a shared heritage (Fenton, 2003). Ethnicity is increasingly recognised as a political symbol; one which defines not just exclusion by a powerful majority but also self-identification as a symbol of belonging and mobilisation (Werbner, 1990).

Minority ethnic people's adoption of 'English' or 'British' identities remains complex; such claims are sometimes difficult to sustain because of the racialised nature of British identity (Bulmer and Solomos, 1999). However the younger generation have challenged and transformed such racialised constructions of Britishness. Their sense of Britishness is often a pragmatic reflection of being born and living in Britain. Young people, find identification with Britishness as particularly meaningful, an argument which relates closely to being accorded more 'respect' within British than Pakistani contexts. The reservations and negative experiences they have experienced, perhaps enhance the young peoples' sense of Britishness:

... we came over from another country, whereas the majority of the youths in Bradford have been born in the UK. They are exactly the same as the White people; they have no tolerance at all. Whatever the White people are doing, Asians are doing also and that is why there is a major difference. The Asian youths believe that this is their country and they should be given the same rights as the White people have. They do not want to tolerate anything anymore. That is the only reason why they are demanding their rights. They believe that they are just as much British as the British are. (Ramzan Latif, aged 64)

I mean I have heard stories about when you know like when certain people came over and how they suffered racial abuse and racial attacks and I think there was a lot of it going on. I think now it is a bit, now it a lot different because number one the Asians are not going to stand there and take it to start off with. They are going to stand up for themselves and I think a lot of it is to do with the generation now, they younger generation I think [...] they don't basically give a shit now, they won't take any crap. (Zahida Ali, 31)

Our parents' intentions were to come to the UK, earn a living and go back home and settle back down at home. And then as we have been born and grown up we have more or less decided that this is our home and that it is not back in Pakistan. So we see it as in thirty years time, forty years time still being here and our parents didn't think of that. So we would like to more or less make it known that we are here to stay. Like we said our parents in their days might have had a bit of trouble and they might have thought "oh we

will get rid of them now" and at our age we are thinking we are not here to go we are here to stay cos we have been born here and this is our home town, home country. (Kamran Ahmad, 19 and Omar Akhbar, 20)

Conclusions

The riots of 2001 have generated the now to be expected raft of official reports (Burnley Task Force, 2001; Cattle, 2001; Ritchie, 2001). These are poor relatives of the official investigations into earlier waves of 'rioting' such as Scarman. They say little about the 'riots' themselves, and tend focus on broader issues around the management of public services. Most strikingly they have promulgated an ideology of 'community cohesion' organised around crude functionalist ideas of social integration where we should all come to share a common social identity. In contrast initial academic analyses have been more critical (Farrar, 2002; Ray and Smith, 2002). In this paper we have focused on particular aspects of the Bradford 'riot' and different generations of Pakistani's responses to it. There is much more about which we have data, but have yet to consider in more detail. Most significantly perhaps has been the response of repression and ideological mobilisation by the state in response to the 'riots', the criminalisation of a political event, as well as the role of the police. More needs to be considered about neo-fascist mobilisations and contemporary racism among the White working class. We have barely scratched the surface of gendered and generational responses to the riots. Questions of 'social cohesion' and social integration need to be thoroughly examined and the officially constructed mythology taken apart.

What we have attempted here is simply to ask some of the people in the Pakistani community in Bradford what they thought happened on the day, and what they think the consequences have been. In this paper we have focused on particular features of the 'riot' and inter-generational differences in views about the 'riot'. This has led us to a re-evaluation of earlier accounts of 'riots', especially those of the 1980s. Firstly, we think that those accounts have ignored the role of neo-fascist mobilisations in provoking some of those 'riots'. This has led to a partially misleading focus on the role of the police, as those 'riots' that were most closely analysed - St Paul's in Bristol and Brixton - were indeed responses to police action, others were not. Secondly, we feel that all types of analysis of the 1980s riots, (with the notable exception of Keith (1993)), have over-emphasised the role of young African-Caribbean men, and consequently mis-represented both the ethnic and class unity of those events. Furthermore, the riots of 2001 represent more than anything class disunity and inter-ethnic conflict, albeit 'mediated' through the police.

In addition, not only are the 2001 'riots' themselves different in substance from those of the 1980s, how we approach them theoretically and politically is also quite different. In substance the 'riots' were more ethnically homogenous. In Bradford on 7th of July 2001 what started as a multi-ethnic event became almost entirely an event involving Pakistani men. What the riots are expressing are new modes of 'racialistion' (Miles, 1989) on the one hand and new ethnic identities on the other. The old racialisation of Britain's ethnic minorities, crudely put, saw African-Caribbeans as 'having problems', whilst South Asian's 'have culture'. This also shaped academic research. The new racialisation is rapidly pathologising the South Asian communities of northern England. Discourses of gang-culture, forced marriages, drug abuse, inter-generational conflict, resistance to integrating and speaking English and being Muslim are all routinely mobilised to explain away racism and justify dubious policies. Post September 11th they have increasingly been constructed as the new 'Enemy Within'. In contrast to how others see them, second and third generation South Asians, as we have seen from our interviews, are constructing new identities, differentiating themselves from their parents, yet continuing to be Muslim/Pakistani/Kasmiri and British.

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The Daily Express

The Guardian

The Observer

The Times

Yorkshire Evening Post

Yorkshire Post

APPENDIX

TABLE 1

Ethnic Composition of 'Riot' Locations 2001

| | Leeds | Bradford | Burnley | Oldham |
|------------------------|--------|----------|---------|--------|
| All people (number) | 715402 | 467665 | 89542 | 217273 |
| | % | % | % | % |
| White | 91.9 | 78.3 | 91.8 | 86.1 |
| Mixed Race | 1.4 | 1.5 | 0.7 | 1.1 |
| Indian | 1.7 | 2.7 | 0.5 | 0.7 |
| Pakistani | 2.1 | 14.5 | 4.9 | 6.3 |
| Bangladeshi | 0.4 | 1.1 | 1.6 | 4.5 |
| Other ethnic groups | 2.6 | 2 | 0.5 | 1.2 |

Source: Census of Population 2001, ONS.

TABLE 2

Religion In 'Riot' Cities 2001

| | Leeds | Bradford | Burnley | Oldham |
|------------------------|--------|----------|---------|--------|
| All people (number) | 715402 | 467665 | 89542 | 217273 |
| | % | % | % | % |
| Christian | 68.9 | 60.1 | 74.5 | 72.6 |
| Buddhist | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 |
| Hindu | 0.6 | 1.0 | 0.3 | 0.6 |
| Jewish | 1.2 | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Muslim | 3.0 | 16.1 | 6.6 | 11.1 |
| Sikh | 1.1 | 1.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Other religions | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.1 |
| No religion | 16.8 | 13.3 | 11.0 | 8.9 |
| Religion not stated | 8.1 | 8.1 | 7.3 | 6.5 |

Source: Census of Population, 2001, ONS.

TABLE 3

Age Group and Ethnicity of those sentenced for Offences Committed on 7 July 2001.

| Age Group | Ethnicity | | Total |
|------------|-------------|-------|-------|
| | South Asian | White | |
| Under 17 | 15.9% | 25.0% | 15.5% |
| Aged 17-20 | 30.5% | 0 | 29.8% |
| Aged 21 + | 53.7% | 75.0% | 54.8% |
| Total N | 82 | 4 | 86 |

Source: Reports in Bradford Telegraph and Argus.

TABLE 4

Age Group and Reported Area of Residence of those Sentenced for Offences Committed on 7 July 2001.

| Residence | Age Group | | | All |
|--------------------------|-----------|------------|-----------|-------|
| | Under 17 | Aged 17-20 | Aged 21 + | |
| East Bradford | 0 | 18.2% | 8.5% | 11.0% |
| South Bradford | 50.0% | 9.1% | 23.4% | 20.5% |
| Manningham | 25.0% | 27.3% | 29.8% | 28.8% |
| Heaton | 0 | 22.7% | 21.3% | 20.5% |
| Rest of Bradford | 0 | 4.5% | 2.1% | 2.7% |
| W Yorks Outside Bradford | 25.0% | 4.5% | 6.4% | 6.8% |
| Outside West Yorks | 0 | 0 | 2.1% | 1.4% |
| Keighley | 0 | 13.6% | 6.4% | 8.2% |
| Total N | 4 | 22 | 47 | 73 |

Source: Reports in Bradford Telegraph and Argus.