The Cultural Transmission of Hate
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The field of hate studies began as a response to the Aryan Nations firebombing of Bill Wassmuth home. Wassmuth was an Idaho priest who organized the Northwest Coalition against Malicious Harassment and helped form the Institute for Action Against Hate (IAAH) at Gonzaga University. The IAAH’s interdisciplinary approach (legal, educational, religious, journalistic, community based, psychosocial concern for Human Rights) pointed up the extensiveness of the problem—hate was everywhere and to combat it would take efforts from many sources.

By 1992, Congress criminalized hate declaring each act “[a crime in which] the defendant’s conduct was motivated by hatred bias, or prejudice, based on the actual or perceived race, color, religion, national origin, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation or gender identity of another individual or group of individuals.” (HR 4797; Disabilities added in 1994)

Law enforcement has had their work cut out since that time. Many hate crimes go unreported, are difficult to prosecute, and the victims are unlikely to carry through to trial. Educational efforts and campaigns to End the Hate has created a public awareness of the problem more than ever. In spite of those efforts, the number of hate crimes has continued to flourish with noticeable surges in ethnic attacks post-9/11. At present, the United States averages approximately 10,000 acts of hate each year. (fbi.gov)

In one of the most democratic and wealthiest nations in the world, there are more questions than answers. Why does hate persist? How are beliefs which degrade others formed? What are the cultural mechanism by which such beliefs are transmitted? Why do some beliefs transcend time and space transferring their vitriol nation to nation and generation to generation?

This purpose of this paper is to investigate the course of hate belief by reviewing the theoretical and research literature on hate formation with a special
focus on transmission processes--how hate beliefs flourish, transmit, decay and are revived. A new model of hate transmission based on cultural norms and personal vulnerability will then be proposed.

Hate Belief Formation

Hate begins with prejudice. Prejudice is "an antipathy based on a faulty and inflexible generalization." (Allport, 1954 p. 9) While some earlier formulations occurred (e.g. F. Allport, 1924) much of today's understanding began with Holocaust refugees providing the basis for investigations into one's fascist nature viz., California F-scale. (Adorno Frenkel-Brunswick, Levinson & Sanford, 1950) Though discredited due to methodological and theoretical limitations, (Martin, 2001) some early childhood experiences such as a frustrated basic needs (Staub, 1989), traits e.g. Right Wing Authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 1981, 1996) and certain orientations (Sidanious & Pratto, 2001) have proven valid over time. By contrast, investigations into nonprejudice orientations (Phillips & Ziller, 1997) and clinical data (Chin, 2005) has been much slower to evolve. Antisemitism research (Ostow, 1996) has waned considerably since the 1960s supplanted by race and general investigations into the psychology of stereotypes and prejudice. (Footnote 1) Socially constructed (Berger & Luckmann, 1966) stereotypes, misperceptions and cognitive mistakes became the focus of racism research which evolved into three separate lines emphasizing: 1) norms for appropriate interracial behavior--Regressive Racism (Rogers & Prentice-Dunn, 1981) 2) racist contexts, stereotypes and value systems--Aversive Racism (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986) or 3) racist beliefs learned at an early age.--Symbolic/Modern Racism. (Sears & McConahay, 1973).

Concerns for prejudice and stereotypes soon highlighted differences in context and culture rather than personality (e.g. Pettigrew, 1958). By the 1960s and 1970s both research and theory were concerned with sociocultural effects and
group processes pinpointing social identity formation. (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, Tajfel, 1982) Intergroup bias, stereotyping and interest in competitive minimal group situations soon gave way to a more comprehensive cognitive approach where intra and intergroup processes were scrutinized. Currently the research direction is a blend of separating out the myriad of cognitive and social approaches (Duckitt, personal communication) and includes social influence, defined as behavior change due to 1) individual or group inducement 2) concern with legitimate authority, 3) the nature and strength of induced behavior and social context. (Kelman & Hamilton, 1989) as well as compliance and conformity. (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004) As only one review of the social psychological literature has been completed (Harrington, 2004), the reader is referred to multiple reviews of prejudice, racism and stereotypes (e.g. Duckitt, 1992 a, b; Hilton & von Hipple, 1996; Phinney, 1990; Schneider, 2004) classic experiments (e.g. Sherif, & Sherif, 1953; Asch, 1951; Milgram, 1974, Zimbardo, Haney, Banks, Jaffe, 1974) and the voluminous literature on culture and cognition with its emphasis on co-creation, communication and interaction. (Adams & Markus, 2004; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Schaller, Conway & Crandall, 2004)

One’s allegiances to their social group and their identity appears to be central to understanding the psychology of hate formation. In contrast to one’s personal identity and individual thoughts and unique emotions, the heart of hate has to do with the group-in-mind and thinking in the collective through one’s cultural and social identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and self-categorization. (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher & Wetherell, 1987) As all groups are constitutionally ethnocentric, xenophobic, prone to social dominance (Waller, 2005), and vigilant for attack (Gaertner, Dovidio, Anastasio, Bachman & Rust, 1993) thinking in the collective, cultural and social can create hate. Just being temporarily assigned to
a group is sufficient to trigger ingroup favoritism and outgroup disdain and proclivities towards social dominance. (Brewer, 2001; Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, & Sherif, 1961; Tajfel & Turner, 1979)

There are both cognitive and emotional components to prejudice. Some researchers have found prejudice to be predictive of discrimination (Dovidio, Brigham, Johnson, & Gaertner, 1996) while others have focused on emotions. For example, when Susan Fiske and her colleagues (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick & Xu, 2002) asked subjects to rate others along the dimensions of warmth and competence, key emotions (i.e., pity, envy, disgust, pride) were found to predict discriminatory acts at rates twice that of stereotypes. e.g. Asian/Jewish/Wealthy: Warmth(Lo) Competence(Lo)->Envy; Middle Class/White/U.S: Warmth(Hi) Competence (Hi)->Pride; Elderly/Disabled: Warmth (Hi) Competence (Lo)-> Pity.

Researchers have observed both subtle and blatant aspects to prejudice (Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995) as well as unconscious and implicit aspects as well. (Banaji, Lemm & Carpenter, 2004; Devine, 1989; Greenwald, McGee & Schwartz, 1998) A number of new technologies has evolved and appear to hold much promise in that they bypass psychological defenses permitting direct evaluation of the automatic unconscious aspects of hate. e.g. Implicit Association Test (IAT). In the IAT, (Banaji, Lemm & Carpenter, 2004; Fazio & Olson, 2003) a subject responds to a series of items that are to be classified into four categories—typically, two representing a concept discrimination such as flowers versus insects and two representing an attribute discrimination such as pleasant versus unpleasant valence. Subjects are asked to respond rapidly with a right-hand key press to items representing one concept and one attribute (e.g., insects and pleasant), and with a left-hand key press to items from the remaining two categories (e.g., flowers and unpleasant). Subjects then perform a second task in which the key assignments for one of the pairs is switched (such that flowers
and pleasant share a response, likewise insects and unpleasant). The IAT produces measures derived from latencies of responses to these two tasks. These measures are interpreted in terms of association strengths by assuming that subjects respond more rapidly when the concept and attribute mapped onto the same response are strongly associated (e.g., flowers and pleasant) than when they are weakly associated. (e.g., insects and pleasant) Other measures incorporate pictures instead of words and focus on key narratives and themes e.g. Zaltman Metaphor Elicitation Technique--ZMET though its direct application has been directed more towards consumer and clinical aspects. (Zaltman, 1997) Exciting researchers more is the functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and the potential of mapping the neuroscience of racism, hate and other cultural pathologies. (Eberhardt, 2005)

The few theoretical models of hate formation are primarily concerned with genocidal mindset in the average or ordinary person. (Baum, 2004; Staub, 1989; Waller, 2005; Woolf & Hulsizer, 2003)

The lack of epidemiological studies but presence of public opinion polls has led some theorists to offer a statistical model of hate. Citing public opinion surveys of antisemitic sentiment, Baum (2004) has proposed a bell curve depicting a proportion of the population (approximately 15-20%) as antisemitic, 60-70% as ambivalent and a third group 15-20% as nonprejudiced. The three groupings respectively constitute 1) perpetrators 2) provisional perpetrators or rescuers 3) rescuers in a genocide. The differences between groups seems to fall out along lines of mental health and emotional development as lowest, moderate and highest development. The correlations for mental health and antisemitism have been somewhat low, suggesting other factors may be involved e.g. social norms. (Baum, 2005) It seems to be the case that in a genocide, some will rescue, some will kill and the vast majority of ordinary people will bystand or act between
those extremes. Though somewhat limited in application and extensive empirical validation, this conceptualization of hate offers a developmental perspective with extensive clinical implications.

By contrast, Waller’s (2005) model of extraordinary evil focuses on psychosocial processes. Focusing more on the perpetrator inherent in the average individual, Waller proposes how one’s ancestral shadow (socially identified self) blends with negative cultural beliefs, moral disengagement and self-interest creating a perpetrator identity. This perpetrator identity lies dormant unless triggered by a culture of hate where role/person merging, professional socialization and elevated group mindedness are the norm. Such cultures have the same features of those at-risk for genocide. (e.g. genocidewatch.com) While both theories wait formal testing, both models of hate formation offer alternative conceptualizations to Staub’s pioneering efforts (1989) and more traditional genocide approaches. (Woolf & Hulsizer, 2003; 2005)

Whatever questions the theoreticians and researchers have, the clinical fallout for the victims of hate remains the same. When physical attack, injury or death has not been experienced, the recipients are left with anxiety, depression (Gold, 2004) declines in self-worth and negative test performance in school. (Steel & Aronson, 1995)

On an individual level, controlling one’s prejudices has spawn at least two competing research models. Devine (1989) and her colleagues examined the differences between high- and low-prejudice individuals in terms of internalized standards for how one should respond to group members (Low prejudice persons had more internal standards and more guilt which increases consistency among personal standards, thoughts, and behaviors). By contrast, high-prejudice persons searched for how they should respond to other group members. As a consequence, the high prejudiced people felt generalized negative affect as well
as other-directed affect such as anger and irritation, when norms were violated.

More recently, University of Kansas researchers Chris Crandall and Amy Eshleman (2003) proposed a Justification Suppression Model (JSM). The JSM proposed that prejudice as formed by multiple experience e.g. family, direct cultural learning created implicit attitudes that were suppressed by mechanisms distinct from the Devine model. In a series of seven studies utilizing a large sample (N=1,504) Crandall, Eshleman and O'Brien (2002) examined prejudice towards 105 social groups. Whether respondents were evaluating discrimination scenes, reacting to ethnic jokes etc., prejudice was highly correlated with social approval. The findings of the study were poignant: group norms at times were so powerful that they trumped personal ones.

In sum, identifying with one’s ethnic, cultural, social group makes for ethnocentrism, xenophobia and proclivities towards social dominance to take effect. As the cultural/social identity forms, it prepares for pending threat. Several notion have been advanced to explain how hate forms, but few have empirical validation. Once a belief forms, it seems likely that transmission to another is needed.

Hate Transmission

The mechanisms by which a culture transmits its knowledge are still uncertain, but theorists have made several attempts to offer explanations. Memetics have been proposed to explain how cultural concepts (memes) survive (Dawkins, 1976) but are not promising since the basic assumption--that the mind functions exclusively along evolutionary lines may not be valid. (Fodor, 2001) (Footnote 2)

More promising is network analysis which combines mathematic and sociological principles in an effort to map cultural transmission. (Boyd & Richerson, 1985; Xiaoyan, 1988). Such network mapping has been used to follow such diverse phenomena as bird communication viz., how to open milk bottles (Hinde &
Fisher, 1951) cannibalism from observing chickens (Cloutier, Newberry, Honda, and Alldredge, 2002) and food searches among guppies. (Laland & Williams, 1998) Within human networks, mail e.g. small world problem (Travers & Milgram, 1969) and email have been investigated e.g. Watt’s six degrees of separation, as have the telephone game (Kurke, Weick, & Ravlin, 1989) and opinion leadership (Katz, 1957). Group transmission chains (Roberts & Campbell, 1961), urban legends (Noymer, 2001) and terrorist cells have also been analyzed.\(\text{fbi.org}\)

Intergenerational transmission of trauma has been suggested. (Kendler, 1988) Symptoms such as depression (Hammen, Shih & Brennan, 2004) and self-worth e.g. fear of failure (Elliot & Thrash, 2004) have been investigated but the lion’s share of research involves Post Traumatic Stress Disorder(PTSD). PTSD has been documented in survivors and their offspring over several generations viz., Armenian and Jewish genocides. (Novac, 2003) The transfer of trauma may be vicarious. During South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Committee trials, psychologists were called to desensitize witnesses, jurors and judiciary after exposure to hearing repeated accounts of apartheid abuse. (Hamber & Wilson, 2002)

Prejudice transfers vertically (parent-child) horizontally (peer to peer) and obliquely (institution to individual) with peer to peer contact as most effective means of transmission (Fishbein, 2002) though such notions were advanced prior to assessing the influence of satellite television (e.g., Hezbollah’s Al-Manar) and the Internet (e.g. 5,000+ hate web pages).

Urban legend transmission is particularly germane. Though such widespread beliefs violate ontological structures and are inconsistent with theories of mind, biology and physics, they are ubiquitous (Norenzayan & Atran, 2004) and can become epidemic as mass contagious illnesses or UFO sightings has demonstrated. (Hatfield, Cacioppo & Rapson, 1994)
Hate beliefs as a political version of urban legends are equally ubiquitous. A culture’s legitimizing myths (Sidanius & Pratto, 2001) appears to travel the path of Bigfoot through rumors, urban legends, jokes (Davis, 2002) books (e.g. Protocols, Turner Diaries), song and dance and have been examined in multiple cultures including Indian (Das, 1998) African American (Fine & Turner, 2001) and Jewish. (Herzog, 1994; Shul & Zukier, 1999).

Klain (1998) has pointed out the poisoning effect of folk songs from a Croatian perspective while Anzulovic (1999) pointed out the ethnic hate carried in Croatian folk songs. Klain’s investigation of inherited emotions implicated the patriarchal family, folk songs, nationalistic tales and the church dogma as key to understanding hate transmission. He cited guilt, shame, obedience to authority as well as government inspired calls for revenge.

The role of key community leaders, military and church clergy have also been known to incite and disseminate hate. Traditionally insulated from such accusations, clergy hate has been well documented in the Holocaust, Rwanda, Serbia-Croat conflict (Klain, 1998) and post-911 among several key Arab Muslim Imans. While the effectiveness of pamphlets and print media has long been established as effective means of propaganda in the perpetuation of hate, both the television and radio have been recently held accountable in the Serbian and Rwandan genocides. An earlier study found that it [the media] “play[s] a decisive role not only in agenda setting, but also in defining the dominant consensus and preferred interpretations for many public events.”(Van Dijk, 1987, p. 127)

Before the written word, the rumor may have been a way to fill-in-the-gaps of information acting as complementary media (Kapferer, 1990) though such “improvised news” (Shibutani, 1966) differs from real news in authenticity (context dependent) and urgency. (Rosnow, 1988, 1991) Defining rumor as “a specific (or topical) proposition for belief, passed along from person to person,
usually by word of mouth, without secure standards of evidence present,” (Allport and Postman, 1947, p.ix) those researchers first documented how distortions, memory lapses and fantasies occurred in a group of adults conveying a simple narrative. (Footnote 3)

Rumors increase as a function of anxiety or threat. (Anthony, 1973; Buckner, 1965) As the rumor travels, it sharpens and levels growing shorter and more concise, conventionalized (assimilated) and is told with fewer words and fewer details becoming more concrete. (Allport & Postman, 1947; Bartlett, 1932). Rumors about distant events are more persistent than local rumors. (Noymer, 2001) Electronic ephemera analysis (computer hoaxes, chain letters, urban legends, jokes, spoofs, money scams) reveals themes of aggression, antiauthority, mischief and revenge. (Overton, 2001) Conspiracy and contamination are the most prominent rumor themes, followed by lesser themes of opinion, hopes and fears, problem solving and group development, fantasy and fairy tales. (Goertzel, 1994; Rosnow, 1991) Rumors are almost always hostile (66%) or fear-based (25%). (Bordia, 1996) Alarmingly, web page hate research suggests that the tactics used by hate groups are more persuasive over time than originally anticipated. (Aden, 1989; Lee, 2002)

How rumors live or die may provide some insight into belief persistence with implications for hate beliefs. Education and access to mass media affect rumor transmission. (Hatfield et al., 1994) So does age. Noyer (2001) recently observed that older adults gave up believing a rumor much quicker than younger cohorts and discovered that it was that naiveté in younger cohorts keeps the rumor alive. Individuals may not believe a rumor for a particularly long time, yet the rumor persists in the population unabated for years (Noymer, 2001) and is believed even when shown to be irrational or untrue. (Rozin & Nemiroff, 1999) Attempts to suppress a rumor has at times been ineffective (Noymer, 2001) though high level
clergy were fairly successful in reversing the effects of antisemitic rumors in Orleans, France. (Morin, 1971)

Speed of stereotype transmission and its embeddedness in memory as the criteria for successful transmission makes sense in that the more memorable the idea, the faster it is past along and retained. (Sperber, 1990; 1996) Stereotyped traits are more likely to be communicated and persist, their gossip worthiness judged as important and less likely to forgotten. Merely sharing a stereotype with another increases the stereotyping. (Lyons & Kashima, 2003) Even when the alleged ethnic trait was temporarily communicated, it was more likely be believed. (Guimond, 2000) As with rumor, tales, legends and folklore which contain a memorable plot, bright imagery and a slightly bizarre and supernatural theme are passed on most efficiently. (Ruscher, 2001; Ryu, 1998) Several psychological (ease of remembering; intrinsic interest leading to rehearsal; motivation and facility to communicate) and ecological processes (prior exposure; social facilitators or barriers to imitation; institutional structures that reinforce or suppress) have been thought to explain faster transmission and enhanced memorability, but it appears that when elements of reality (natural phenomena) are added, a cognitively optimal narrative (Norenzayan & Atran, 2004) is produced, one which moves at warp speed because the content is just-strange-enough.

The just-strange-enough quality that propels stereotypes is consistent with what linguists know regarding word vitality. A word’s emotional potency is thought to explain its longevity and success in transmission over time and space. (Metcalf, 2002) Emotionality was the “stickiness” involved in antisemitic stereotype transmissions. (Shul & Zukier, 1999) Key emotions such as fear, hostility and envy similarly makes stereotypes and tales reproduce quicker and more efficiently. Recently, Stanford and Duke University researchers found that
people tended to pass along urban legends quicker when they contain both a clear idea and a strong negative emotion, particularly disgust. (Heath, Bell, & Sternberg, 2001)

Though the transmission patterns of urban legends (Heath et al., 2001; Noymer, 2001) and paranormal beliefs (Markovsky & Thye, 2001) have recently been identified, few studies have focused on susceptibility to cultural norms (Bobier, 2001) and the relationship between paranormal beliefs and certain forms of hate i.e., antisemitism. (Baum, 2005) In sum, cultural messages that are simple, consistent and just-strange-enough transmit most effectively. (Brauer, Judd, Thompson, 2004; Lyons & Kashima, 2003; McIntyre, Lyons, Clark, & Kashima, 2004; Schaller, Conway & Tanchuk, 2002) Hate beliefs fulfill those criteria all too well.

Hate beliefs form through the identification with ones social group and its messages are transmitted specifically those that are simple, consistent and slightly unnerving. Low prejudiced persons are the least susceptible to cultural and social influence and highly prejudiced persons are the more vulnerable. To date, no model of has been proposed to explain how those differences occur.

Towards A Normative Model of Hate

Some skeptics have underscored the arbitrariness of beliefs conceptualizing the mind as a belief engine. (Alcock, 1995) As certainty is social, (Kapferer, 1990) most cultures assign a value of high or low realness determined by social consensus. People then “engage in action on the basis of imaginations to which they assign the same degree of credibility as they do to perceptions of the real world.” (DeRivera & Sarbin, 1998 p.xi.) From this perspective, beliefs are “principles of action:. . .they are processes by which our understanding (and misunderstanding) of the world is represented and made available to guide our behavior.” (Harris, 2004 p. 52) Such widespread beliefs (Bar-Tal, 2000; Sperber,
1990) become fixed social representations combining “a semantic knowledge and a belief that is rooted in the culture together with the practices that people live by.” (Moscovici, 2001a, b; p.24) Belief persistence may be due to sedimentation (Aho, 1994) or some other mechanism by which reliability (repetition) and validity (variations that confirm) is established. One quickly knows that Blacks = crime, Jews = ripping off and Hispanics = lazy is true. Whole memories of national events may develop along similar lines, (Wertsch, 2002) and the converse occurs when collective memories of national events are erased, manufactured or “revised” up or down.

Beliefs are not the only phenomenon subject to social forces, in most groups, cultural transmission is guided by a set of norms that identifies what counts as acceptable behavior. (Sober & Wilson, 1998) Learning what the culture approves or disapproves begins quickly. Children as early as four are thought to reflect the prevailing community attitudes and readily absorb the unconscious rules, social habits and norms. (Nesdale, 2004) The power of group norms may serve to explain why at times certain individuals (Sherif & Sherif, 1953) and whole nations (Triandis, 1994) may be prone towards accepting hate beliefs.

People conform to social norms because 1) evidence of what other people do provides socially appropriate information (descriptive) and 2) evidence of what others think as right or wrong, signal what actions are likely to be deemed acceptable (prescriptive). As individuals are rewarded for behaving in accord to authority or look to cultural norms or perceived consensus, compliance increases. (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004) Normative conformity is highest when countervailing social norms are weak or ambiguous. (Cantril, 1941) as in authoritarian cultures or certain subcultures e.g. Southern U.S. where courage, honor, toughness are esteemed and pluralistic ignorance may be operating. (Vandello & Cohen, 2004)
In addition to social construction of beliefs, normative standards and differences in cultures, some individuals may be more prone to go along with the group. Those high group identifiers hold extremely positive impressions of their group (VanVugt & Hart, 2004) and have more positive self-evaluations as a result. (Christensen, Rothgerber Wood & Matz, 2004) By contrast, those who stand up to the group e.g the third of respondents who deviated in key conformity experiments (e.g. Asch, 1956; Milgram, 1974; Zimbardo et al., 1974) may be more psychologically sound and emotionally developed.(Baum, 2004) There is the suggestion that less group identified persons employ a separate psychological mechanism (low suppression) making such individuals less susceptible to all cultural influences including prejudice. Prejudice is highly correlated with social approval. (Crandall, Eshelman & O'Brien, 2002).

Cultural Voice
The most efficient means of insuring conformity and obedience is to transmit through political socialization, norms of behavior that are congruent with the dominant ideology in a society. (Hirsch, 1995, p110). Under the right circumstances, group norms are more influential than personal ones. (Crandall, Eshleman and O'Brien, 2002)

Norms of hate are congruent with underlying social beliefs. (Baum, 2005) Whether norms that guide behavior are on the cultural surface, hidden or internalized and implicit does not appear to matter. Awareness of the norm is not necessary to trigger norm compliant behavior. (Aarts, Dijkserhis & Custers 2003)

Public or popular opinion may act as a norm directing thoughts as well as behavior and may explain how hate beliefs are maintained. Like a second government, hate beliefs may be perpetuated through the unconscious norms of a culture. The vox populi acting as a reservoir conveys a backing of the people through false consensus. Such cultural support and approbation evolves from the
they implied by the popular expression, “you know what they say,” and includes the rebuttle “everybody knows.” Simple folk wisdoms, common folk remedies, populist politics, conspiracy themes, religious and superstitions tales are gleaned via believing what they have said to be true. Like a motorist flashing headlights to warn of speed traps, the Cultural Voice monitors all threats and offers immediate solutions. Some Voice characteristics consist of:

--A tone and cadence that is subdued and neutral, never judgmental or angry similar to that conveyed on televised news coverage on low volume speakers.

--Supernatural attributions and parental imperatives that mix with down home solutions, folk wisdom and fantasy, delivering such aphoristic explanations for events as “God's will,” “timing,” and “fate,” and the amorphous authorship of “everybody knows.”

--All ephemera are weighted equally. Neutral aphorisms like “an apple a day keeps the doctor away” are accepted with the more virulent ones e.g. “Blacks commit all the crime.” “Things go better with Coke” has the same acceptance as “Jews and your money.” Because of equal weighing, hate beliefs appear more benign than they are.

--There is populist, anti-intellectual, slightly conspiratorial (Fenster, 1999) quality to the cultural unconscious. According to Australian researcher Ghassan Hage (2000) 1) The people already know everything there is to know: life taught them. 2) Consequently, anything that the intellectual elite says which is not known by the people is superfluous knowledge, if not actively against the people. 3) Therefore, any attack on the knowledge of the intellectual elite is a defense of the knowledge of the people.

The cultural voice operates in every culture and every nation. Japanese antisemitism provides a laboratory example of how such norms develop and and become accepted as real transferring from superstition to community standard to legally sanctioned belief.

In the early 1980s, there was about 600 Jews and virtually no antisemitism. Then in 1986, author Uno Masami published a series of Jewish conspiracy books regarding Jews, money and planetary takeover. By 1987, the first swastikas
appeared on the lampposts in Tokyo’s Ginza district. Within six years, 3,500 swastika emblazoned handbills were posted around Tokyo though the pamphlets now included Freemasons as well plotting to destroy Japan. By 1992, the Diet elections fielded candidates on a platform that promised to “smite the traitors who are selling out Holy Japan to the diabolical Jewish cult.” The Anti-Defamation League opened an office in downtown Tokyo by the mid 1990s attempting to reverse the newly established norm through dissemination of philosemitic materials. It did nothing to halt the now established idea that Jews were secretly controlling the world.

Conclusion

Psychologist Solomon Asch (1956) first observed that when a single dissenter was present, conformity to others declined. But how does hate cease when it has popular support and widespread acceptance? Recently a team of IAT researchers acknowledged that unconscious stereotypes were so automatic and pervasive that the only solution to the problem was to flood the cultural stream with egalitarian beliefs and hope that people would choose the more logical. (Banaji, Lemm & Carpenter, 2004) But hate is always more sexy than logic and irrational beliefs less complex than rational ones.

Given that hate’s base lies in ignorance, educational specialists may begin to teach how ethnic myths are formed and the methods by which they are transported. They could highlight the differences in thinking between high and low prejudiced persons. They could examine the norms inherent in popularly held beliefs, dissect the effects of unconscious public opinion and search for other components of the cultural voice.

Though it is always easier to focus on politics and the social than one’s emotional life, developing one’s personal identity, their emotional needs, their psychological fitness is key to eradicating hate. Additional efforts could be
directed at developing one’s personal identity and minimizing the effects of the social, cultural, ethnic and religious differences. When tests of psychological health were administered to three different groups, the results were consistent--emotionally healthier respondents endorsed less ethnic myths and hated less than their unhealthier counterparts. (Baum, 2005)

As one develops themselves emotionally, they return to their group with new ears and eyes. Such eradication of hate will take a collective effort. French philosopher André Malraux seemed to understood this when he suggested that the only response to absolute evil, is fraternity.

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Duckitt, personal communication 12/4/04


Footnote 1
A review of an online database for doctoral dissertations (OCLC) with the title of antisemitism is 112. By contrast, the numbers of dissertations with racism in the title numbers 3,209. The annual rates for antisemitic hate crimes in the United States is about 1,500. (fbi.gov)

Footnote 2
If it can be proven that the original evolutionary intention of hate beliefs is group preservation then it seems likely that hate beliefs have outlived their intent. The 174 million killed in genocides in the past century suggests that hate beliefs are not species enhancing. Survey research on certain hate beliefs reveals high levels of hate where the disdained outgroup does not reside or are numerically outnumbered so as to pose no possible threat. Psychopathology specifically cognitive mistakes, (Yalom, 1995) information processing errors and superstitions are replete with associations that do not follow Darwinian principles, as clinicians and IAT researchers can attest. Associations are so powerful that Baylor College of Medicine fMRI researchers found memory and self-image brain activity responding to the sight of the red and white Coca-cola label. (McClure Li, Tomlin, Cypert, Montague, & Montague; 2004)

Footnote 3
Prasad initially proposed a multilevel analysis of cognitive (uncertainty), affective (anxiety), cultural (social myths) and social dimensions (enhances social identity) in India but his more comprehensive approach did not transfer to this country. (Bordia & DiFonzo, 2002) Gossip is
similar to rumor, but slightly different in that it is often less credible (Michelson & Mouly, 2002) but more entertaining (Foster, 2004). The research is performed understandably in workplace and school settings where the effects of lowered morale and lowered productivity can be devastating. (Baler & Jones, 1996) Females are more likely to be targets of sexual gossip (Mishra, 1990) and males of bullying where bullying may itself be an end (McCarthy, Rylance, Bennett, & Zimmerman, 2001) But gossip may create a group moral, through which group norms and values are established and reinforced; gossip also exerts social control over newcomers and dissidents and regulates conflicts with rival groups. (Foster, 2004; Gluckman, 1963)